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Political and intellectual debate in Europe today reveals both a new salience of religion and a reinterpretation -rather than a radical interrogation -of secularization. In a world marked by the vitality of spiritual phenomena (Berger 1999) , Europe continues to be the exception to the rule (Davie 2002) . Interpretations differ regarding the striking contrast between Europe and other regions of similar economic development, such as the United States (Berger et al. 2008) , on this point. Some defend the idea of multiple coexisting modernities, characterized by different relations to the sacred (Byrnes and Katzenstein 2006) .
Others speak of the hollowing out of the religious, which has become for them no more than a cultural resource, normalized and therefore more visible, serving increasingly flexible strategies of identity construction .
In this context, the debate around the possible reference to Europe's Christian heritage in the now defunct Constitutional Treaty i , and the positions adopted by certain countries in response to this, are indicative of the transformations of the relationship between belief and power in the context of contemporary socio-political trends. France and Belgium set themselves apart from the other European member states by both refusing this reference, although they did so from significantly different standpoints. Each country is archetypal in this: France and its allencompassing laïcité, supposing the neutrality of the public space; Belgium and its institutionalized laïcité as a particularism among others, organizing the multitude of philosophical and confessional worldviews ii . A comparative study of these two countries enables us to shed light on the forces at work in the reshaping of the relationship between religion and politics. This reveals both the degree and the means of the Europeanization of structures, processes, societies, beliefs and identities as well as the resistance offered by each national model and the dynamics of convergence within the context of European integration.
It is important to begin with an appraisal of what was at stake in the debate on Europe's Christian heritage and more specifically how this can be linked to the contemporary uses of 3 religion in politics (I). The French and Belgian situations are in congruence with this new articulation between the religious and political fields. Here, it is necessary to distinguish two levels of analysis: the evolution of national models and their internal dynamics. France and Belgium reflect the same structuring role of the national historical arrangements between the spiritual and temporal worlds as other member states, with minor influences of domestic and European political circumstances. European countries are part of the same secularizing trend which leads to an erosion of their differences, but they nevertheless remain on their respective trajectories. (II). If we consider internal dynamics, the analysis of domestic debates and sociopolitical mobilizations in France and Belgium suggests that we are not dealing with a return to faith-based traditional cleavages. On the contrary, it seems that, for certain actors, there is an opportunity to transform their resources with more or less success (III). The religious is thus consolidated in its position as the symbolic vehicle of belonging to a tradition, of political demarcation and identification -without appearing to be an issue that structures partisan behavior. This does not detract from its importance, but leads to it being understood as a communicational phenomenon of self affirmation and expression as well as of social unity, rather than based on content alone. It also seems to be a part of collective culture that functions as a reservoir of meaning, to be freely used for whatever purpose, in accordance with the sociological reality of belief and practice that are today marked by pluralization and individualization.
I. "Christian heritage" in light of the contemporary uses of the religious
Following on from Yves Lambert in the tradition of Weber, Jean-Marie Donegani (2007: 89--92) aptly labels the dominant form of guidance in today's European societies as axiological. What it does signify is the other side of secularization, the culturalization of the religious. The modernity that is incarnated in Europe is accepted as such, with its foundation in a vision of the sovereign individual as the possessor of inalienable rights. In the same movement, the spokespeople for Christianity have attempted to re-appropriate human rights to show that they stem from the Christian understanding of the individual, despite the fact that the Catholic Church long opposed them. Following this process, religion has been reformulated as the common heritage of all Europeans. As it is no longer possible to claim to be the representatives of a now barely credible transcendence, it is the diffuse presence of religion in the collective imaginary of Europeans that is emphasized here, as a particular way of encoding social interaction. There is thus a passage from a religion functioning as a form of determinism, based on a timeless dogma, to a culturalized religion offering the tools to decipher social transformation by proposing a return to the updated origins of European civilization (Kalinowski 2008: 305--310) .
The debate around the Christian heritage of Europe is part of a more general trend to return to the origins -particularly medieval -of political constructs. This involves the twofold danger of reifying them as atemporal entities that feed the fantasies of pure unity, or denying them 6 their importance in the name of their perpetual redefinition (Geary 2004: 23) . This brings back the sanctified foundation of political community and the original process of "nationalization" of pre-existing cultural resources (memory, myth, symbols, values and traditions). These were part of the religious domain in the pre-modern era, before the powers of the state borrowed or limited them, to organize and secure the loyalty of the populations it administered (Smith 2003 Rather, it constitutes another episode in the ongoing redefinition of these relations. In accordance with the now above all expressive and communicational functions of the religious repertoire, the controversy in the European public space has essentially been built around symbolic references rather than institutional organization or the processes of public policy.
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This was largely the case in the political and media spheres of the different member states, and notably those which were particularly exposed, such as France and Belgium.
II. France and Belgium: the resilience of national models

Mapping the strategies of nation-states
France and Belgium are far from sharing the same vision of laïcité. On one hand, the French state regulates, arbitrates and is the key reference for a pluralism of integration. On the other, the Belgian state guarantees a pluralism of juxtaposition where various particular identities coexist (Martin 1994: 71--83) . These two countries do not appear to be those whose national models have most influenced or are the most compatible with the treatment of the religious in Brussels. The German philosophy of recognizing confessional organizations both as cocontributors to the public good and as public policy actors, is often seen as the most convincing "blueprint" for EU practice (Willaime 2004: 108--109) of the quite flexible practices found in reality. Belgium did so to defend the internal equilibrium of a consociational political system that is undergoing spiritual diversification and is jeopardized by the erosion of its pillars, but which remains caught in the juxtaposition of its domestic particularisms.
III. Mobilization and the effects of the debate in France and Belgium
The debate around the Christian heritage of Europe is in line with usual European debatesalthough with a little more intensity than usual. As such, it follows on from the French and
Belgian models of political communication on the EU -or the absence of communication.
The decision to organize a referendum or not, itself a result of the democratic tradition in each society, only reinforces the differences in the political situations of both countries.
Once we have taken the specificities of each political model into account, the observation is the same: the extent of the publicity around the debate had little effect on its actual impact, which remained limited. The recognition of Europe's Christian origins is above all a symbolic issue that has only the potential to reactivate the historical resources and codes relating to communication and identity for established actors. It does not significantly affect the existing lines between parties and doesn't provoke the emergence of new institutional voices. It is however marginally used to distinguish between leaders of the same political family, thus being a potential source of greater pluralization -if not conflictualization -in political discourse. In order to compare the Belgian and French configurations, it is necessary to successively distinguish between the impact of the general articulation between the national model and Europe, the effects on the party system of accommodating the religious factor, and the dynamics of the social mobilization around the issue of Europe's Christian heritage.
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The impact of attaching the national model to Europe
Simple/compound polities and the promotion of the debate about Europe
In order to summarize the Franco-Belgian differences in the processes of political communication surrounding Europe we can borrow the categories used by Vivien Schmidt.
Schmidt distinguishes between two types of discourse and two types of polities, according to who speaks, to whom and how. She describes a coordinative discourse, where the principal interlocutors are public policy actors communicating amongst themselves using the language of expertise. This she opposes to a communicative discourse where public policy actors express themselves to the people by mobilizing the language of values (Schmidt 2006: 253--256) . Schmidt also distinguishes between simple and compound polities. France falls into the former category, marked by the dominance of the executive, the restriction of the representation of interest groups and strong political polarization. This creates a favorable environment for the communicative discourse in a theatrical exchange between the government and the citizens. Belgium, on the other hand, has a compound system, characterized by the division of powers, a broad consultation of interest groups and politics oriented to consensus. This leads to the primacy of the coordinative discourse. In this typically consociational situation, exchange with citizens does not happen directly but rather through the intermediary of "sub-discourses", directed to particular audiences with limited publicity (Schmidt 2006: 258--262) .
The EU itself consists of a compound political system of extreme complexity, with an extremely elaborate coordinative discourse and a very limited communicative discourse (Schmidt 2006: 262) . National leaders and elites in certain sectors remain the chosen mediators and the often biased and partial conveyors of the European message. In countries that are compound polities, the European level simply adds to the plurality of pre-existing 14 echelons; there is already a great number of actors and specialized coordinative discourses into which supranational issues can be integrated. The situation is more complicated in simple polities. The European coordinative discourse runs counter to the more vertical rhetoric of national politics. Non-governmental actors are rarely associated with the justification of policy and thus do not respond so easily when solicited by Europe on these questions. They may even adopt a strategy of opposition to decisions that they deem to be against their interests or on which they haven't been sufficiently consulted.
One European debate slightly more virulent than another
Placed in this double perspective, the debate on the Christian heritage of Europe is part of the framework of the respective national models of political communication on European issues, in France and Belgium. In France, exchanges were relatively well publicized, given the standard level of discretion regarding EU events. They rapidly turned to a discussion on the philosophical and historical interaction between national identity and laïcité in France and its compatibility with a European reference. The principle spokespeople were political leaders and general intellectuals, used to participating in public affairs. Civil society organizations (religious groups and to a lesser extent laïque associations) reached limited audiences with their discourses and were often moderate in their approach. In Belgium, in accordance with the traditional omerta on European affairs and more broadly with the consociational philosophy, there was no real debate in the public space. This does not necessarily imply a total consensus on the part of political leaders, but when we attentively observe any signs of dissatisfaction in the party discourse regarding the relation with Europe (Pilet and Van Haute 2007) there is scarcely any trace of religious issues. On the other hand, there was vigorous lobbying by humanist networks in civil society and the results were successful in political terms because the government adopted the desired position of refusal.
Each socio-political model thus specifically conditioned the range and means of the debate on Europe's Christian heritage. Whether or not there was a referendum is not so much the cause of differences, but a reflection of the historical division of political labor and the adoption of European themes by France and Belgium. In France, the referendum was a means of developing the debate in the political and public space, even thought the religious theme occupied a lesser role in the hierarchy of the campaign issues and the determinants of the vote. In Belgium, voices were raised to call for a referendum or a popular consultation on the European Constitutional Treaty, but the political and juridical difficulties of such an enterprise, involving a modification of the constitution, destined it for defeat (Jacubowitz 2004 ).
The accommodation of the religious question by the party system
Two roads for religious cleavages and the separation of church and state
Since Belgium's creation, the country has experienced the union of liberal and Catholic forces In the 19 th century, France was to become a pioneer in the elaboration of Christian democracy. As Hans Maier demonstrates, this was precisely because here, more than anywhere else, the revolution had attempted to eradicate religion by force (Maier 1992) . 
Political initiatives in favor of a reference to the Christian roots of Europe
In both countries, a few individual initiatives took place from center-right Christian democracy to conservatives and extreme right. It did not lead to shifts of political lines and cleavages.
In divided from the beginnings of integration (Chenaux 2007, 88-89 ; 75-81) . Their hostility towards Germany was not relegated to secondary importance until after the concretization of the communist threat, particularly following the "Czech coup", and the materialist and Christian democracy and conservatism around a resalience of religion (Delwit 2003) . The interpretation is rather that the religious theme functions as a political resource that moderates the cartelization of parties in their pro-European unanimity. It offers a symbolic vehicle for some "adventurers" to set themselves apart in criticizing an overly materialistic Europe and denouncing its attacks on the national identities entrenched in the Catholic tradition.
Mobilization of civil society
The strong depoliticization of Church discourses did not encourage Catholic laymen to advocate the defense of their identity reference. Thils (1990) , defended the idea of "plural unity" for Europe, following Edgar
Morin's line of thought, and arguing that holding onto a national Christian past as an element upon which to build political cohesion in Europe was a mistake.
Similarly in France, the ecclesial hierarchy was moderately inclined to support a political discourse on the Christian roots of Europe and often appeared to tag along with the Vatican on this issue. Since the condemnation of Action Française in 1926 and the abandonment of any attempt for unified political action, but also in accordance with the political pluralism of Catholics on the issue of European unification, the French Catholic Church was obliged to take a back seat (Airiau 2007) . It is much more attentive in the negotiation to adapt the French laïque regime in matters of public policy..
Conclusion
Considering the global picture of national models, the debate around the Christian Turning now to French and Belgian internal political life, the debate seems to have reactivated symbolic resources of differentiation and the expression of particular identities rather than genuine cleavages. In France, we observe a certain resurgence of religiously oriented identity demands; claims that have been largely appeased in the public space since the end of the 1920s and have been voiced ever since by actors on the periphery of the religious and political spheres (Déloye and Riva 2007) . Marginal Catholic forces hostile to the forms and principles of European integration use religion to attempt to gain an audience on the issue of national identity and to develop trasnantional structures and strategies. In Belgium, the religious question also lost its controversial character from the first half of the 20 th century onwards, notably thanks to the pacifying effects of "consociationalism" (Frognier 2007 The episode of the Christian heritage of Europe did not lead to a reconflictualization either in Belgium or in France. The European framework simply allowed for the prolongation of a battle that was exhausted at the national level -transforming it into a struggle to resist or to accommodate change. More generally, the religious repertoire is above all instrumental and serves as a platform for socio-political demands regarding recognition and reassurance; it is molded by historic national models and European policy channels. These functions and secondarity of religion are reminiscent of what happened with more intensity in other less secularized member states, where national histories and the requirements for belonging to the EU are also hinged upon the religious as both a site of collision and mutual arrangements.
This encourages us to reassess the apparent specificities of France and Belgium: two singular forms of laïcité quite distinct from each other, but which are simply encountering questions common to all European societies.
Notes
i The analysis is focused on this debate which is more revealing both in its scope and its constitutional implications, without neglecting the importance of the debate that preceded it, during the drawing up of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
ii Our purpose here is neither to discuss the normative value or efficiency of "laïcité" (for a criticism of its social uses in France and a defense of the principle, see Laborde 2008) nor the actual existence of a European "laïcité" understood as a common set of principles for all member states of the EU (Willaime, 2010) . We address "laïcité"
as an empirical category which is widely used by institutions and actors to describe national settings of relationships between politics and religion and which is given various meanings to relate positively or negatively to Europe.
iii Belgium has a system that could be described as being based on « separation-recognition ». This was born out of the 1831 constitution and amended several times since. Over the years, it has shown considerable flexibility in its capacity of adapting to change. Belgium has therefore never known the Concordat: the 1831 constitution allows for the organization of a system of support to recognized religions without mentioning juridical agreements. 
